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Is Banking on the Brink? Another Look
During the recent recession, most U.s. banks
were hit by increasing problem loans and de-
faults; on top of this, many banks faced losses
because of their holdings in distressed areas like
commercial real estate. At the same time, banks
were expanding into a variety of new and non-
traditional areas. The combination led some to
believe that the banking industry was on the
brink of disaster.
Problems in banking are a public concern be-
cause taxpayers are ultimately responsible for
federal deposit insurance losses. The insurance
fund's liability roughly depends on expected
losses due to bank failures, which in turn depend
on bank risk. Large increases in risk could call
for some form of policy response, such as higher
minimum bank capital standards, restrictions on
bank activities, or structural changes in the su-
pervision and regulation of banking. Indeed,
major new federal banking laws were enacted in
both 1989 and 1991 in an effort to deal with per-
ceived threats to the deposit insurance system.
Against this background of public concern, it is
vital that the condition and riskiness of the indus-
try be characterized accurately.
This Letter analyzes trends in the riskiness of u.s.
banks over the past four years. Three measures of
risk are derived from financial market data, each
shedding light on a different aspect of risk. The
results show that while u.s. banks have been
moving toward riskier assets and activities, in-
creased capital has offset much of this increased
operational risk. As a result, although the federal
deposit insurance liability soared during the re-
cent recession, it has declined to more moderate
levels as bank capital ratios have risen.
What matters in bank risk?
For any bank, two elements determine the ex-
pected losses to the deposit insurance fund: the
probability that the bank's own capital will be
exhausted (causing the bank to fail) and the size
of any consequent deposit insurance payout.
These two factors reflect two broad types of
banking risk. The first is operating risk, which
can be measured most directly in terms of the
variability of bank earnings. This risk can be
quantified by the statistical standard deviation of
the rate of return on all of a bank's investments
and activities, referred to as "asset volatility." All
else equal, a bank with higher asset volatility is
more likely to fail, and if it fails is more likely to
impose a larger loss on the insurance fund. The
second broad type of risk is leverage or financial
risk, which depends inversely on a bank's capital
ratio (the ratio of capital to total assets). For a
given level of asset volatility, a bank with a lower
capital ratio is more likely to fail.
Calculating capital ratios and asset volatilities in
order to measure risk is not straightforward, and
many of the traditional methods have failed to
give accurate and timely indications of changes
in the riskiness and condition of banks. One pos-
sible failing of traditional approaches is that they
rely largely on accounting information, which
may not be relevant for analyzing potential losses
to the deposit insurance fund; deposit insurance
losses at failed banks depend on economic val-
ues, or "market" values, of bank assets and
liabilities, not on their historical cost.
New data, new methods
In an effort to develop new analytical tools, in-
creasing attention has focused on the use of price
data from financial markets. Market prices suc-
cinctly capture a huge amount of diverse infor-
mation, reflecting consensus opinions of many
market participants, each of whom is diligently
trying to gather and use the best and most accu-
rate information. Financial models have been
created to use this market information to gauge
the condition of banks.
In particular, models have been developed to
infer the market value of capital and asset vol-
atility by working backwards from the stock
prices of banks. These relatively new models are
based on "contingent claim" analysis: The level
and volatility of bank stock prices are used to
divine bank capital ratios and asset volatilities
and to filter out any effects deposit insurance
might have on stock prices. In theory, the capital
ratios and volatilities derived through these
newer methods reflect economic values and








tinuing an upward trend that extends back at
least to the beginning ofthe 1980s. The figure
also displays separate results for 24 banks and
holding companies based in the Twelfth Federal
Reserve District (nine western states); operating
risk has been higher on average for Twelfth Dis-
trict banks, with the time pattern roughly track-
ing the national average.
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of Return on Assets
Exclusive reliance on market-based methods
probably is inappropriate. Traditional financial
statement analysis provides useful insights, and
the information collected by bank supervisors
through on-site examinations and regular off-site
reporting are valuable. But market-based data
are at least a useful supplement to these other
sources, providing a different perspective on the
same problems, and at best may give a more
accurate characterization of risk in banking.
The study
The study examined 150 banks and bank holding
companies from the Compustat database from
January 1989 through September 1992. These
firms tend to be larger than the industry average,
and thus may not be completely representative.
However, they give direct information about an
important segment of the fndustry, and may serve
asabarometer for U.s. banking as a whole.
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Figure 2 shows the weighted-average market
capital ratio. The low point in bank capital
ratios-and hence the high point in financial
risk-coincides with the beginning of the sharp
rise in operating risk in 1990. However, as asset
volatility rose, market capital ratios began a sus-
tained increase, with the average ratio for this
group of banks rising nearly five-fold from the
third quarter of 1990 to the third quarter of 1992.
Capital ratios generally have been higher for
Twelfth District banks, with the pattern roughly
mimicking the national average; however, capital
ratios fell over the last year ofthe sample, raising
financial risk for western banks relative to the
country as a whole.
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Trends in operating risk and financial risk
Figure 1 shows the evolution of bank operating
risk; banks became somewhat riskier over the
last few years, especially from mid-1990 to mid-
1991. This jump roughly coincides with the re-
cession, although it lags the official timing of the
downturn by about one calendar quarter. (The
NBER dates the recession from July 1990 to April
1991.) Asset volatilities leveled out, and even
declined slightly, in the most recent quarters.
Viewed over the entire period, the rise in oper-
ating risk roughly matches the rate of increase
Furlong (1988) and Levonian (1991) find for 1981-
1989. Thus bank operating risk seems to be con-
Market capital ratios and asset volatilities were
computed quarterly for each bank; results for
each date were then averaged, with individual
bank results weighted by bank asset size. Finan-
cial risk rises if the average market capital ratio
decreases, whereas operating risk goes up if aver-
age volatility increases. The estimated capital
ratios and asset volatilities also were combined
to examine the net effect of the two basic types
of risk on deposit insurance liability. (The deposit
insurance contract is in effect another contingent
claim, the value of which depends on asset vol-
atility and the capital ratio.) In addition to its
intrinsic interest, the deposit insurance liability
serves as a valuable summary measure of risk,
because it incorporates the net effects of both
financial risk and operating risk. (The actual
computation of all three measures of risk is fairly
complicated; see Furlong 1988.)The fact that financial risk fell as operating risk
rose should not be a surprise. A positive relation-
ship between capital and asset risk has recently
been codified in the form of risk-based capital
standards, and other studies have shown that
even before these formal standards were imple-
mented banks with higher asset volatility gen-
erally had higher capital ratios. For the banks
and the time period studied here, simple statisti-
cal analysis reveals that capital ratios increase by
about 2.25 percentage points for each 1 percent-
age point increase in asset volatility. Because of
the inverse correlation between operating risk
and financial risk, looking separately at trends in
either bank capital ratios or the riskiness of bank
assets and activities can give a misleading pic-
ture of overall banking risk. Changes in the two
may at least partially offset one another; hence,
a summary measure of risk is indispensable.
Putting it together: how close to the brink?
Figure 3 shows the average deposit insurance lia-
bility over the sample period for the United States
as a whole. This estimate ofthe liability, expressed
in cents per hundred dollars of deposits, reflects
the economic cost of insuring bank deposits. As
discussed above, it is notonly a direct reflection of
the risk of losses to the deposit fund, but also a
summary measure ofbank risk that subsumes both
operating risk and financial risk. The figures are
sensitive to certain assumptions made in the mod-
eling; as a result, the time pattern is more trust-
worthy than the precise dollar amounts, and is
the appropriate focus of attention.
Risk to the deposit insurance fund began to go
up in the third quarter of 1989 as capital ratios
began to fall, and markedly soared in mid-1990.
As Figure 2 showed, bank capital had declined
to very low levels at that point. As operating risk
began its sharp rise-perhaps as a result of the
recession-the position of the deposit insurance
fund became increasingly precarious. However,
once the increase in asset volatility leveled off,
and as capital ratios continued to improve, the
insurance liability declined to near (although still
somewhat above) its previous levels. Consistent
with this trend, bank failures in 1992 and 1993
have been well below earlier FDIC predictions.
Conclusion
Banks have been increasing the riskiness of
their business since at least the beginning of the
1980s. Moreover, a jump in asset risk in mid-
1990, combined with the depressed capital ra-
tios prevailing at that time, caused a substantial
increase in overall banking risk, as reflected in
the potential for deposit insurance fund losses.
However, a subsequent leveling off of asset risk
coupled with a marked increase in the average
capital ratio brought the deposit insurance lia-
bility back to roughly its previous levels.
Whether the current level is still "too high" is,
of course, a separate and important question, but
compared to 1990 the more recent data do not
suggest that the industry sits on the edge of a
precipice. However, the conclusion would have
been different in late 1990, especially if the
alarming trends at that time had been projected
into the future. The broader lesson from this epi-
sode may be that there are forces-market, reg-
ulatory, or other-at work within the current
banking environment that act to correct exces-
sive risk when it arises, nudging the industry
away from disaster when it is at its most fragile.
Figure 3:
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